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SAMUEL PISAR*

The Changing Economic and Legal
Environment for East-West Investment
As your opening speaker I assume that you want me to give you an insight
into what is going on in this exciting new field, what is likely to happen to it in
the foreseeable future, and how an attorney who specializes in international
transactions generally and in East-West trade and investments specifically, goes
about planning, negotiating and structuring transactions for American
corporate clients.
If you are to follow me into this strange legal world, a world which is far
outside the range of the average corporate attorney, I must first make a few
political, economic and even ideological allusions. The contrasts between the
Eastern and Western systems are great indeed and the legal issues that arise
cannot be properly understood without reference to this broader framework.
Almost five years ago I published a book, Weapons of Peace, in which I wrote:
In the historic contest between Western democracy and Eastern communism our
most effective weapon is not our far-flung and costly military establishment but our
superior capacity for economic progress. The tender sword that will open the East is
economic and industrial cooperation and the human freedoms that go with it.
I submit that at least two parts of this thesis are now proven. As to our farflung and costly military establishment, today's tragic events in Indochina
demonstrate that this weapon is not the only one we must rely on if we are to
face the future with confidence. As to economic and industrial cooperation with
the East, it has developed over the last five years to a point which is almost
astounding.
On the subject of human freedom, while there is increasing circulation of
ideas and of people between East and West, the progress has so far been far too
limited. All in all, the balance seems, however, positive and promising.
The world economy has become increasingly transnational in the last two
decades. In the last five years it has acquired a new dimension. It has become
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trans-ideological as well. Somehow business people have managed more effectively than armies, churches, or diplomats to cross national and ideological
borders. I believe this is a welcome trend. It is a trend toward cooperation,
toward stability, and even toward peace.
The cold war is behind us, although the dangers are still there, and I would
not want to minimize them. Americans are beginning again, I believe, to look
upon themselves more as Yankee traders than as Yankee soldiers. Our military
preoccupations in the last quarter century, while essential, were going against
the national grain. I think we are more ourselves when, in addition to being
vigilant about our security, we wield those weapons of peace that I define as
economics, commerce, technology, and all the great achievements that have
made this country so productive and envied for almost 200 years.
For the indefinite future we will have in the world two different types of
societies, two different types of economies. One is based on private enterprise;
the other is based on state enterprise. It is fairly clear that one will not destroy
the other with thermonuclear bombs. It is equally clear that neither will voluntarily dismantle its own social and economic institutions.
If you accept this premise, then you must accept a conclusion which I think is
very important for our profession. As practicing lawyers interested in this
opening segment of the world economy we must help develop new legal techniques that would enable expanded business intercourse across ideological
barriers.
Let me be more specific. What is new from an economic and legal point of view
in this area?
The first thing that is new is that the United States, after many years of
absence, has returned to most of the Communist markets of the world. This
absence has not been a healthy one. It was abnormal for an economy like ours,
which has a gross national product much larger than that of the nine Common
Market countries put together, to have only one-tenth of the Common Market's
trade with the East.
The Europeans and the Japanese have looked upon the Eastern markets for
many years as their private hunting preserve. That has now changed. American
industry is now negotiating transactions. It is signing contracts. It is importing
and exporting. It is constructing plants. It is also beginning to invest.
This change has provoked waves in Europe. Many Europeans say to me in
Paris and London: "You Americans are creating with the Russians a new kind
of Yalta. You are trying to exclude us from these markets. You are doing to us
economically today that which you did 30 years ago politically." I believe this is
nonsense. All that is happening is a normalization of a highly abnormal situation.

InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. I

Changing Economic and L egalEnvironment
The other thing that is new is that America and Russia have somehow
developed a liking toward each other in the economic field. To me, again, this is
completely logical. If we set aside for a moment the political and ideological
differences which exist, and will continue for a long time, and if we look at the
underlying economic realities, we find a strange, paradoxical affinity between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
Both are continent-size countries. Both have populations exceeding
200 million people, a variety of climates, vast seacoasts and rivers and enormous
natural resources.
The challenge which the Soviet Union faces today, and I believe the more
reasonable and creative leaders there are fully aware of this challenge, is how to
establish an efficient system of mass production, and mass distribution to feed
and clothe 250 million souls living in a vast continental expanse.
Where has this job been done? It has been done in the United States, a long
time ago. I believe, therefore, that America's historic example is today highly
relevant to Russia's pressing needs. This is why there is an apparent love story
between the Soviet and American industrial communities. And this is why there
are so many contracts negotiated by large corporations.
It is a question of size. The two countries are of the same scale. They like to
think big because of the realities I have just mentioned. A Soviet Minister has
recently put it this way: "Our projects are enormous. Almost every one of them
is worth a billion dollars. When I deal with European companies they do not have
sufficient industrial, credit and management capacity. When I sign them up for a
large project, I have five or six contracts, which gives me five or six headaches.
When I deal with a large American company, I have only one headache."
The next thing that is new is that economic relations are not only expanding
quantitatively; they are also expanding qualitatively. It is no longer enough to
.speak of Soviet-American trade, or East-West trade, in terms of physical commodities that change hands in export and import. This can be at best a limited
thing, because there is an inevitable ceiling that hangs over this type of trade,
owing to hard currency shortages and means of payment on the other side.
The nature of transactions is now evolving in a different direction. We see more
and more exchanges of technology and patent and know-how licenses. We see the
beginning of investments. Many transactions that I would characterize as investments have been fully negotiated, and even put into operation. A number of
them have proven profitable to both parties.
In Eastern Europe, the development of investments as a growing supplement
to trade is clearly apparent. I recall in 1967 and 1968 my advice to a large
corporation that was planning to build luxury hotels in Eastern Europe when
such a transaction seemed at first almost inconceivable because of the political
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and ideological climate of the time. Imagine, a Western capitalist corporation
wanting to move into a Communist economy, to make an investment in a real
estate-related transaction, and to come out with a profit. But this is exactly what
was done. Those of you who have been to Budapest lately will see that a magnificent modern hotel now stands on the bank of the Danube. A similar hotel
stands in the center of Bucharest. Today, these types of transactions are
specifically permitted by law. In 1971 the Rumanians passed a law which allows
Western equity investment in Rumania with local state companies, and a number
of such transactions have been closed. This followed an earlier Yugoslavian
example.
In 1972 Hungary passed a similar law, and Bulgaria and Poland are considering comparable legislation. But even while such legislation remains in the
planning stage, transactions of this type are being negotiated on an ad hoc
basis. By now they run into the dozens.
So far as the Soviet Union itself is concerned, such legislation does not exist
and, in my opinion, will not exist for a long time to come for the simple reason
that the Soviet Union considers itself the fountainhead of Communist ideology.
From the standpoint of Marxist doctrine, a law which allows capitalists to have
ownership in Communist means of production is not an easy pill to swallow,
regardless of economic need.
Nonetheless, through various kinds of pragmatic devices, transactions of this
type are being satisfactorily shaped. A considerable amount of legal ingenuity
has had to go into making them possible at a time when they are precluded by
the prevailing philosophy and legal system. Here is an area I would particularly
like to stress as a challenge to the legal profession. The need to be creative, the
need to abandon old terminology and old habits, the need to open up our minds
and say to ourselves that our clients are entering a completely different
environment and that we must develop a new capability to assist them. For they
are not going from the United States to France, or to England; they are going
into a state-operated, state-owned economy where there is no competition,
where the government is the manufacturer, the banker, the seller, the buyer, the
insurer, the shipper, even the adjudicator, in a way.
In such an environment you cannot go to work with the traditional concepts
of our own legal system, and our own principles of commercial law, practice and
customs.
For example, take the mammoth Occidental Petroleum deal with the
Russians, a transaction of close to $10 billion, if all goes well over a period of 20
years. Essentially, this deal requires the American firm to help build in Russia a
large number of plants to produce ammonia out of natural gas, of which there is
great abundance in Siberia, together with ports, pipelines, tankers, and infrastructure, and then to buy that ammonia for the world market where it is in
InternationalLawyer. Vol. 10. No. I
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short supply. In exchange, the Soviet Union has committed itself to purchase
fertilizers derived from phosphates mined in the Gulf of Florida. What was
really needed was to establish or expand an active industry in the Soviet Union.
Call it what you will, this is an investment. But it could not be structured as
an investment and, therefore, instead of dividends, instead of profit participations, a certain price formula was invented, which would take me hours to
describe, even if I were professionally free to do so. In essence by agreeing on a
price for the purchase and sale of product, you can translate an ideologically
inconceivable distribution of dividends into an ideologically palatable entitlement to adequate profits.
Similarly, in 1968 the Japanese negotiated an enormous deal to develop the
Siberian timber industry. More than a dozen Japanese corporations and banks
have signed contracts with the Russians to bring in equipment, engineers and
know-how, to cut down forests and to ship the product over the long term of
various parts of the world. There, again, it was impossible to form a jointly
owned corporation, to have a balanced Board of Directors, or to reproduce the
kind of model to which our clients are accustomed when they do business in
Western Europe or in any other liberal or reasonably liberal economy. But by
using a price formula and other pragmatic devices, both sides were able to
accomplish their objectives without running afoul of ideology and of the law.
With this in mind, let me throw our a few hypotheticals to give you a feeling
for what might happen in the years to come if investments in the East were really
to take off and to become a significant factor in the world economy, as I fully
anticipate.
I have already said that ownership in a Communist economy is in principle
impossible, because it is constitutionally provided that no private parties can
own the means of industrial production. This clearly pertains to private capitalists from abroad. Therefore, our habits of mind, or the habits of mind of our
clients, who want to own and control everything, must be adjusted if business is
to be done in this area. Acceptable, legitimate ways must be invented to
overcome seemingly insurmountable prohibitions and, generally, a complex
maze of theoretical and practical obstacles.
In the alien environment of East-West investments the notion of ownership is
outmoded. I would even go so far as to say that it is unnecessary. While you cannot
build a plant in the Soviet Union and hold title to it, I am wondering,
however, what is to stop you in the years to come from building the plant, transferring it to the Soviet state, and taking a leaseback for say 20 years. Now you
have not offended the local system, you have some form of control over the plant
and you may not really need any more than that. I defy anyone to prove to me that
Marx or Lenin said anything against leasebacks.
The same, let me repeat, is true with dividends. Except under the new East
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European legislation I have mentioned, dividends are impossible. But you can
accomplish something similar, maybe even better, with royalties, with
engineering fees, with interest charges, and various other types of compensation.
American companies like to control everything wherever they establish or
acquire a business, and in Western Europe we have often been able to negotiate
for them in 51 percent, a 99 percent or even a 100 percent voting position. In the
East this is of course, out of the question. Now, I don't want to underestimate the
importance of control. Many firms operate with high technology and require very
sophisticated quality control before they will allow their trade name to go on a
product whether it is to be sold in the Soviet Union or anywhere else in the
world.
When the Ford Motor Company withdrew from the Kama River truck plant
project, almost five years ago, the main negotiator, for a while, became
Daimler-Benz. In the end they pulled out too, for a number of reasons. One of
these reasons was that they were afraid lest, with Mercedes-Benz engines in
them, those trucks were seen in Russia and in some underdeveloped countries
standing idle on the roads or being repaired in public view. Mercedes-Benz was
afraid for its reputation, unless it could obtain adequate production controls.
This position is understandable. The Eastern side is beginning to understand
that in the ultimate analysis adequate quality control provisions serve its interest
as well.
I submit to you that something in the nature of control could, perhaps, be
accomplished, not by appointing Americans to a Communist Board of Directors-that is something you might as well forget-but by writing a careful
management contract and by providing for some kind of technical management
committee or technical advisory committee, a provision which is innocuous in
concept and terminology, but which grants the Western party enough
protection to accomplish what it really needs for its own good and the good of
the joint venture.
The performance record of Eastern trading and investment partners is a very
favorable one in Communist countries. It is now established that the level of
contractual compliance is first rate. Communist banks have an excellent
reputation for the way they repay loans and pay interest, and Communist enterprises usually fulfill their obligations to the letter, once they are written down in
an unambiguous way: In this connection, I might add that the Communist
mentality in drafting contracts is very much like the American mentality. The
Russians, like American and English "common lawyers," but unlike Western
European "civil lawyers," prefer to cover all foreseeable problems in their
contracts. The reason is that a Soviet trade official is really a bureaucrat. He
doesn't like to take risks. He has very little to gain and a great deal to lose if the
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chance he takes misfires. He therefore looks for safety in carefully formulated,
precise agreements.
Once there is a written agreement you can rely on it. From the standpoint of
honesty and performance we have little or nothing to complain about, little or
nothing to worry about, as long as the drafting has been done by a careful,
experienced hand.
There are other things that make the Communist countries attractive places
for investment. They have stable, growing economies. They are politically safe,
strange as this may sound. If you make a large investment, no one is going to
nationalize you. The entire economy has already been nationalized long ago;
you have nowhere to go but up.
There are other paradoxes that lawyers run into in dealing with these
countries. Let me provide a few additional examples.
How many United States companies who are about to sign a licensing agreement or a sale of engineering say, "We must have a confidentiality provision.
We don't want our industrial know-how passed on by the buyer to any third
party." This is second nature with our clients and their general counsel. You
should see their expressions when we say to them: "You know, in the Soviet
Union there is a law which says no inventor, no licensee, no plant manager has a
right to any secrecy. On the contrary, if he discovers something new, if he
develops a more effective industrial process, he has a positive duty to share that
process with every other production unit in the country. There is of course no
competition, and because of that, know-how has to be spread about. Efficient
production in one state-owned plant is just as important to the society as the
efficient production in another state-owned plan." How do you reconcile these
two contradictory approaches to confidentiality? That is a question you have to
face in almost every contract.
Secondly, consider the concept of force majeure. If a Communist supplier who
has signed a contract with you suddenly sends you a cable: "Sorry, I cannot
deliver because our Ministry of Foreign Trade canceled the export license," or
"Our government has suspended the project because the priorities in the
national economic plan have changed," this is allegedly aforce majeure. And I
can cite dozens of decisions of American, English, French or Italian courts which
say that when the sovereign makes it impossible to perform a transaction, the
axe falls where it falls and there is no liability in damages or anything else. Now,
in doing business with an Eastern economy, such a solution is unacceptable to a
Western company because what is to stop the president of the Communist enterprise with which you have signed from calling up the Minister who appointed
him and asking the Minister to get him out of a contract by canceling his export
license or passing some other disabling decree? The relationship is so close
among those who make business decisions and those who make government
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decisions that your Communist partner can, theoretically at least, create his
own force majeure. Several large arbitrations are being conducted in Paris and
London at the present time on this very situation.
Next, take pricing. It is impossible to know how a Communist economy
determines the prices at which it wishes to buy or sell. As a matter of fact, in
selling, state corporations are unable to calculate costs of production. Their
accounting principles make this virtually impossible, although some of the
smaller Eastern European countries are paying new attention to this problem.
Generally, they look at world prices and then they say to themselves: "We have
something to sell, the world price is so much; therefore, our price will be so
much minus X." X is normally the small fraction that is needed to make it
possible to dispose of the amount of products that must be disposed of under the
official export plan. In other words, they establish their export prices by reference to prevailing prices in the capitalist markets of the world. Investment
decisions in relation to the world market are also influenced by this mentality
and the Western partner in such investments could not hope to impose his own
criteria and the ground rules which his corporate auditors have prescribed.
I would like to end by saying this: at the firm to firm level, the process of
East-West business cooperation that has been started recently has been started
well. I have been observing the difficulties and distortions prevalent in this field
for almost 20 years. Today I often have to pinch myself to believe that what is
happening is really happening. The most important thing now is no longer
whether we should do business with the East, but how to do it so that our
economy and our clients can reap from it proper advantage. We must concern
ourselves not only with the volume but also with the nature of transactions, and
help move them into new directions, particularly from trade to investment.
What I forsee one day is a world economy that is not only integrated on a
transnational basis but also on a transideological basis, where communist and
capitalist companies not only deal with one another, but also jointly in the
international marketplace through what I call "transideological" corporations.
You can have a Communist state enterprise and a capitalist private enterprise
together forming a company either to produce or to distribute worldwide. In fact,
a number of such companies already exist, with the equity divided on a 50/50
basis, with the Board of Directors equally balanced, even to a point where the
alternating chairman doesn't have a casting vote and the management is jointly
selected. These companies have as their primary objective to produce and to sell
efficiently, in short, to make a profit. That kind of cooperation begins to stagger
the imagination. Through such cooperation the two formerly hostile sides are
able to develop an even greater vested interest in stability for the simple reason
that they want their common enterprises to continue and to be prosperous.
Multiply such ventures ten thousand times, and you have a web of integrated
InternationalLawyer,Vol. 10. No. 1
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relationships with a lot of money and resources invested on both sides, and a lot
of energy, effort and careers devoted to its preservation and perpetuation.
I hope that this pattern between East and West will spread to the less-developed countries. One might wonder what would happen in a country like India
with its famine prone country of 500 million inhabitants if both sides employed
such transideological corporations? The Aswan Dam in Egypt would probably
have been a better dam if Russia had built it in cooperation rather than in diplomatic competition with the United States. Whatever the third world location,
who could compete with a combination of this type, the Western country
supplying the technology, the management, the credits, and the Eastern side
supplying the raw materials, the highly skilled labor, which is still modestly paid
and never on strike? Imagine a joint venture of that kind, bidding for a sugar
refinery in Lebanon, a desalinization plant in Isreal, or a steel mill in Brazil!
There is also an entire area where the two sides, East and West, face the same
problems and have basically similar interest. For example, how do you contain
pollution in the atmosphere and the oceans on a global scale, how do you decide
on the development of new sources of energy at a time when various countries
are putting into operation different types of atomic reactors with risks and
dangers that no one has fully evaluated? How do you cope with growing shortages in the world food and fertilizer supply? Decision-makers on both sides are
now aware of the need to pool the experience and know-how that exists in the
United States and in the Soviet Union for these purposes. All of these are fields
where investments from the West in the East, from the East in The West and
jointly in other parts of the world, make a lot of political and economic sense.
The discernible pattern today suggests that with time such investments will
become a normal part of the international scene.
International lawyers will have to face up to the urgent and important question
of how best to advise clients in this new and rapidly changing economic and
legal environment. That is the first big challenge.
The second challenge, to both lawyers and policy makers, is how to develop
an appropriate institutional framework of laws and regulations that would
encourage development of trade and investments among a free enterprise
system such as ours and a state enterprise system such as theirs.
QUESTION: In drafting these contracts, you have a language problem. How
do you solve it?
MR. PISAR: It depends on which country you are dealing with. Nothing is
better than a knowledge of the local language. If you go to Romania, you can do
almost anything in French. Every Romanian seems to speak French. The
Hungarians speak German, for obvious historic reasons. The same is true in
Czechoslovakia. The Poles speak Russian, but prefer to speak French or
English. In the Soviet Union a knowledge of Russian is certainly important,
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. I
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although some business can easily be transacted in German or English.
If your client goes to any of these countries he needs an interpreter unless, of
course, his East-West counsel speaks all of the above languages. When necessary, the Eastern side will provide an interpreter, but you may prefer to take
along interpreters of your own and many companies do.
The contract itself is normally, at least in the Soviet Union, in two languages,
Ru~sian and English, in the case of a United States company, and the two texts
are equally authentic. What would happen if a dispute arose and the two texts
were in parts contradictory? Which one would prevail? We don't really know
how an arbitrator or judge would resolve this conundrum. In the small East
European countries many contracts can be negotiated and signed in English,
French or German alone.
QUESTION: You mentioned the possibility of a sale-leaseback in an Eastern
country as a means of gaining effective use of productive assets while skirting
the issue of actual ownership. What are your views on the possibility of using a
lease of equipment or a plant as an effective financing mechanism outside the
plan, where you can structure possible tax advantages for a Western company, a
good cash flow for the Eastern partner, but retain ownership effectively of assets
located in an Eastern country?
MR. PISAR: That might even be easier than a leaseback on a plant. Several
such transactions have been negotiated. There are some issues that you must
think about. If it is going to be a lease of equipment, you are going to be the
owner of that equipment. Now, suppose the rent isn't being paid, and you have
to repossess. You would normally require, under such a lease, the guarantee of
the state foreign trade bank of the country where you are locating the equipment, and the guarantee of such a bank is very good.
QuE sTION: Would they guarantee lease payments as well?
MR. PISAR: In some of the East European countries they would. Therefore,
the question arises, if they do that, they might as well undertake to pay for the
equipment in installments and in that case the entire lease concept begins to
resemble a foolproof loan.
QUESTION: What would be the ordinary length of time to complete a transaction, not a Kama River plant-type thing?
FROM THE FLOOR: One transaction, from start to finish in the Soviet
Union, which had to go to the Council of Ministers for approval, was completed
in less than a year, but there was some precedent on what the negotiation was all
about. We have done the same thing in Poland in less than a year.
MR. PISAR: I would say that is an average time. I have known transactions
that have been going on for years and are still not closed. On the other hand,
when the Soviet Union has a shortfall in the economic plan, some plant didn't
perform the way it was expected to, or the product that came out was defective,
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and the rest of the economic plan all along the line is waiting because the
product is urgently needed, there is then a high priority. When that happens,
you can move in and in a matter of weeks negotiate and sign a very complex
transaction.
QUESTION: Would you tell us what you foresee in the development of the
attitude of the United States Government toward export licenses for high technology?
MR. PIsAR: The attitude has changed drastically, not only the attitude of
those who administer the export control legislation, but the legislation itself was
liberalized in 1972. Today there are two things to consider. First, the Department of Commerce which, for the most part, has jurisdiction to say what is
strategic and cannot be exported. It has lately become quite generous in its
interpretations. The second thing is that the American export control criteria
that used to be much more severe than the strategic criteria of the Western
alliance as a whole (plus Japan) are now much more similar.
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